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Formalization and Quantification in Historical Analysis 
(1987)∗ 
Charles Tilly 
A Wave of Formalization 
In historical analysis, the first great wave of formalization started in the 1950s and 
began to lose its force in the 1970s. Now it has spent itself. When and how will the 
second wave arrive, if it ever does? Let us address the question in characteristic his-
torical fashion: by examining the first wave carefully, to see if it displays regulari-
ties that help specify the conditions under which something similar might occur 
again. 
Formalization? I mean a variety of procedures that match descriptions of events, 
structures, and process with explicit models of those events, structures, and proc-
esses. Formal methods do not necessarily involve quantification or computing; 
analyses of linguistic, spatial, or temporal structure, for example, often proceed 
quite formally without Computers and without any direct intervention of mathemat-
ics. In history, however, the formalization that concerned history’s technical inno-
vators in the 1960s and 1970s typically included quantification and/or computing. 
Among historians as a group formalization gained a number of energetic advo-
cates during the 1960s. To some, the increasing availability of formal procedures 
for the investigation of large numbers of cases opened the way to science and cer-
tainty. A kind of populism attracted others; they saw the possibility of letting inar-
ticulate people speak for themselves through the real behavior reflected in parish 
registers, arrest lists, and similar sources. In either case, the path toward formaliza-
tion typically led through collective biography: the assembly of standardized de-
scriptions of individual units—persons, households, firms, places, events, points in 
time, or something else—into portraits of the entire sets, and into means for study-
ing variation among the individual units. 
Full-fledged formalization in history involves four activities: conceptualization, 
measurement, modeling, and estimation. Conceptualization concerns the statement 
of an historical question as a problem susceptible of formal treatment—for exam-
ple, conceiving of a plantation as a kind of firm (and thus suitable for analysis in 
terms of the economics of the firm) or of a community as a closed population (and 
thus available to the demographic analysis of fertility change in closed populations). 
Measurement refers to organizing the evidence in standard, comparable form, for 
example by assembling similar records of income and expenditure for all house-
holds in a village. Modeling involves the formal statement of an argument concern-
ing the expected pattern of a phenomenon, for example the explicit retrodiction that 
in a given German town more of the Mittelstand than of other classes will turn out 
to have supported Hitler. Estimation, finally, means matching model to evidence in 
order to see how well the model fits, for example by means of a statistical proce-
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dure, the correlation coefficient, that determines how close to linear is the relation-
ship between wage levels and class voting. 
All formalization requires some version of conceptualization, measurement, 
modeling, and estimation, but analysts do not necessarily give them equal attention. 
Formalizing historians have, in fact, devoted little of their ingenuity to conceptuali-
zation, modeling, and estimation. Often they have unwittingly accepted the con-
cepts, models, and estimation procedures that are implicit in a particular quantita-
tive routine, for example by running a straightforward ordinary least squares 
multiple regression of electoral results on social characteristics of the populations of 
electoral districts—an act assuming implicitly that the electoral districts are coher-
ent, independent units, that the social characteristics of those units somehow cause 
the votes of their electorates, that strong causality would show up as a linear in-
crease or decrease of one sort of vote as a function of increase or decrease of a par-
ticular social characteristic, and so on. Often historians have truncated their formal-
izations: taken considerable care with measurement, only to interpret the 
measurements informally, for instance by constructing a time series of strike activ-
ity and then inserting it into a nonquantitative discussion of rising or falling class 
consciousness. Historians have, on the other hand, made great contributions to 
measurement; they have, for example, devised ways of reworking religious records 
into solid indicators of fertility, mortality, and nuptiality; research done on the re-
sulting historical evidence has altered our ideas of the conditions for large-scale 
population change. 
Formalization had important successes in historical research. Without formal 
analysis based on collective biography, we would lack almost all of historical de-
mography, most city-by-city studies of social mobility, major treatments of political 
activism, and much more. Demographic, social, urban, and economic history all 
underwent significant renewals through the introduction of formal analysis and col-
lective biography. That many wheels spun idly and that the ratio of results achieved 
to effort expended was often painfully low goes almost without saying; such things 
usually happen when unprepared people start experimenting with complex new 
techniques and equipment. On balance, nevertheless, the introduction of formal 
procedures enriched the possibilities of historical analysis. 
Despite indignant complaints about the irruption of positivism into history, 
many historians then felt that formalization and quantification were the wave of the 
future. Jacob Price and Val Lorwin—no wild-eyed enthusiasts—introduced their 
volume on quantitative history with the declaration that: 
From France to Scandinavia to Japan, quantitative ways of thinking, quantitative 
approaches, and quantitative methods have entered the mainstream of historical in-
vestigation. In all areas, major quantitative work is now being done, and even more 
is likely to be done in the immediate future. The neglect of the possibilities of 
quantitative research by so many American historians working on topics outside of 
United States history leds to an unnecessary restriction of their analytical tech-
niques and an unfortunate enfeeblement of their results. Not all problems are 
equally suitable for quantification; nor will quantification ever become the exclu-
sive or even preponderant form or mood of historical investigation. Yet if histori-
ans in the United States and other English-speaking lands working on the history 
of other countries wish to move to exciting frontiers of research endeavor in their 
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respective areas of interest, a greater proportion of them than at present will have 
to think and work in part quantitatively1. 
Lorwin and Price’s statement, although restrained and sensible in its context, 
rings quaintly today. “Existing frontier of research endeavor”? In economic, demo-
graphic, and electoral history, quantification has ceased being an adventure in itself; 
historians in those specialties quantify as a matter of course. Almost everywhere 
else, however, quantitative analysis has lost much of its following. It is now fash-
ionable to decry formal methods as sterile and reductionist, to insist on the central-
ity of consciousness, mentalities, and culture in historical experience, and therefore 
to regard textual explication, retrospective ethnography, and the construction of in-
telligible narratives concerning daily experience as history’s true frontier. As Erik 
Monkkonen, an experienced quantifier, reports: 
From scholarly journals to the New York Times, historians have been castigating 
themselves for excessive narrowness and a decline in the public voice of their pro-
fession. This critique has been articulated through a call for a return to “the narra-
tive”, which seems to mean well told, dramatic stories of the past, which attract 
large readerships, public attention, and respect. Indirectly, quantitative history has 
born the brunt of this critique, though it includes many non-quantitative forms of 
history as well2. 
The new critique has an ironic side. It arrives more or less in step with the long-
awaited appearance of major works of quantitative social history such as Wrigley 
and Schofield’s Population History of England and the Stones’ An Open Elite?3. 
But since Lawrence Stone himself has lent an influential voice to the critique, it 
represents more than a discordant noise in the profession, at least in the Anglo-
Saxon world4. In contrast, Continental Europe looks different. There, formal analy-
ses are still proliferating: studies of Nazi membership, enumerations of Swiss Ak-
tivierungsereignisse, content analyses of Medieval texts, and much more. There, 
furthermore, even studies concentrating on qualitative variations and states of mind 
commonly turn to some sort of formalization as an auxiliary to their analyses. 
Daniel Roche’s treatment of eighteenth-century provincial academies, for instance, 
deals mainly with the organization and culture of those quintessential Enlighten-
ment institutions; yet Roche does not hesitate to map, graph, or quantify the provin-
cial savants’ activity: not only such obvious features as social origin and age at 
death, but also more esoteric matters such as themes of poetry read and contents of 
appointment letters5. Continental institutional, cultural, and intellectual historians 
often turn to formal methods of analysis. 
                                                             
1  Val R. Lorwin and Jacob M. Price, eds., The Dimensions of the Past: Materials, Problems, 
Opportunities for Quantitative Work in History (New Haven, 1972): 10. 
2  Eric Monkkonen, “The Challenge of Quantitative History,” Historical Methods 17 (1984): 
86-94. 
3  E.A. Wrigley and R.S. Schofield, The Population History of England, 1541-1871: A Re-
construction (London, 1981); Lawrence Stone and Jeanne Fawtier Stone, An Open Elite? 
England 1540-1800 (Oxford, 1984). 
4  Lawrence Stone, “The Revival of Narrative: Reflections on a New Old History,” Past and 
Present 85 (1979): 3-24. 
5  Daniel Roche, Le siècle des Lumières en province: Académies et académiciens provinci-
aux, 1680-1789 (Paris, 1978), 2 vols. 
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To some extent, the difference between Anglo-Saxon and Continental European 
reliance on quantification reflects differences in the questions being asked. Gener-
ally speaking, quantification provides little help in attempts to account for single 
instances of anything, especially if the explanations being considered rest on gen-
eral traits of the individual, group, or place in question. Quantification becomes 
more useful as a function of a) the complexity of the explanatory model, b) the in-
trinsic quantifiability of the phenomenon to be explained, c) the importance of 
variation to the argument, and d) the number of units observed. Any form of “ex-
ceptionalism” tends to make quantification uninteresting, even distasteful. Thus the 
greater readiness of continental scholars to place their subjects in a comparative 
frame, and yet to employ complex arguments, inclines them toward quantification. 
Clearly, the post-1950 wave of formalization did not strike all parts of the his-
torical shore with equal force. At one extreme, such specialties as economic and 
demographic history made formal methods their standard procedures. At the other, 
fields such as intellectual history, diplomatic history, and the history of science re-
mained almost untouched by formalization. In between, political history, urban his-
tory, social history, labor history, and related subdisciplines divided by specific sub-
ject; the study of social mobility, industrial conflict, urban segregation patterns, 
elections, and household structure became quite formal, for instance, while students 
of power structure, war, revolution, gender, urban planning, and social movements 
rarely ventured into formal analysis of their evidence. Within these intermediate 
fields, methodological struggles, line-drawing, mutual suspicion, and name-calling 
multiplied. 
Disciplinary Agendas 
Although these struggles entailed plenty of misunderstanding, they did not result 
from simple ignorance. Disciplinary agendas were at stake. In any discipline, mem-
bers organize themselves in two fundamental ways: a) by creating a bounded inter-
personal network, often one that is formalized via organizations, meetings, journals, 
and similar devices; b) by establishing a shared agenda which includes pressing 
questions, certified means of answering those questions, and a recognized body of 
relevant evidence. 
Let us concentrate on the pressing questions. All historical fields having any 
practical coherence organize around a very limited number of “payoff questions”—
questions which define the field, whose pursuit requires little or no justification 
among practitioners, with respect to which specialists are instantly alert to new an-
swers, confirmations of disputed answers, or challenges to widely accepted an-
swers. At any given moment, only a limited number of alternative answers to the 
big questions are typically in play; otherwise, members of the craft worry about its 
disarray. 
Labor history provides a case in point. Labor history is a bipolar field. It actually 
organizes around two partly independent sets of questions. One set sums up to the 
very broad query: What relationships exist among the organization of production, 
the formation of social classes, and workers’ collective action? Under that broad 
rubric fall narrower and somewhat more manageable questions such as “Which 
kinds of workers, in what circumstances, most regularly engage in class-conscious 
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militancy, and why?” That and perhaps a dozen other questions inform the bulk of 
research and writing in labor history. 
The other cluster of questions cumulates to this one: What historical circum-
stances determine the rise and fall of militant and/or effective national labor move-
ments? This question, unanswerable as stated, breaks into a small series of less gen-
eral inquiries. Within labor-history-defined-as-national-movements, one of the few 
venerable payoff questions is “Why so much more socialism in some countries and 
periods than others?” Broadly speaking, the main alternative answers to that old 
query now under serious consideration are variants of the following: 
1) The organization of capitalist production varies significantly over time and 
space, and only some (few) versions of it promote sharp confrontations of 
labor and capital; those confrontations produce support for socialist pro-
grams. 
2) The political strategies of states and national elites—for example, coopta-
tion and corporatism—strongly affect the availability and viability of a so-
cialist reply to capitalist power. 
3) Other features of social life, such as the presence of ethnic divisions, the 
diffusion of bourgeois styles of life, or the structure of workers’ residential 
communities, govern the extent of working-class consciousness, and there-
fore the support for socialism. 
4) Specific historical experiences and leaders, such as responses to the De-
pression of the 1930s, shape the political choices and possibilities available 
within any particular state. 
Put so generally, to be sure, these answers could all be correct simultaneously. 
Only when a historian specifies one of the statements further (for example, by 
claiming that American geographic and class mobility diminished working-class 
consciousness) or assigns preeminence to one of them (for example, by insisting 
that working-class socialism appears only in early phases of rapid industrialization) 
do sharp contradictions arise. But historians, including labor historians, proceed by 
alternation between the deliberate sharpening of such contradictions and the judi-
cious synthesis of competing arguments. The choices, and the balance among the 
choices, remain fundamental to their work. At a given point in time, only a handful 
of such questions define the overall agenda of the entire field. 
Labor history has an indefinite boundary, a chaotic periphery, and a relatively 
well-defined core. Labor historians regard historical research and writing as impor-
tant to the extent that it a) renews understanding of the conditions underlying na-
tional fluctuations in the militancy and/or effectiveness of worker action, b) helps 
connect the organization of production, the formation of social classes, and worker 
collective action, or c) both. By and large, the successes of formal analysis have 
occurred in labor history’s periphery. They include: 
- time-series; analyses of the determinants of fluctuations in national levels 
of strike activity, 
- treatments of the organizational bases of workers’ collective action, 
- studies of the demographic correlates of different sorts of industrial organi-
zation, 
- reconstructions of labor migration and its consequences, 
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- quantitative portrayals of occupational mobility and of social ties among 
different occupations, and 
- research on the urban geography of migration, work, and workers. 
These sorts of studies have great merits. (At least I hope so, since my own efforts in 
labor history lie almost entirely in these areas). But they do not address the organiz-
ing questions of labor history directly. 
The organizing questions, on the other hand, resist formalization. Remember the 
ideal conditions for useful quantification: 1) an explicit, complex model of the 
process or structure under analysis, 2) intrinsic quantifiability of the phenomen to 
be explained, 3) importance of variation to the central arguments, 4) large number 
of units. Although the major models of labor history are often complex, they are 
rarely explicit. Many of the major phenomena figuring in those models, such as 
class consciousness and revolutionary will, are not obviously quantifiable. Varia-
tion is a sometime visitor to the central arguments of labor history; although the 
differences between two countries are often at issue, even that minimum compari-
son serves mainly to identify the unique properties of each individual country. And 
the central arguments of labor history rarely deal explicitly with large numbers of 
units, except in the sense that they sum up the experience of all workers, all labor 
unions, and so on. 
Where Formalization Works 
Many other historical fields resemble labor history in these regards. Intellectual his-
tory, the history of science, diplomatic history, political history, the history of war-
fare, and most synthetic national histories (e. g. the histories of India or China) 
rarely employ explicit models, deal with intrinsically quantifiable phenomena, ana-
lyze variation systematically, or treat large numbers of units—at least not all at the 
same time. And these characteristics stem directly from a concentration on payoff 
questions that resist formalization. 
Within labor history, consider the problem of national labor movements. Formal 
analyses of strike activity and quantitative treatments of the organizational bases of 
workers’ collective action begin to address that issue. Yet labor historians tend to 
question their validity and relevance on the grounds that the formal analyses in 
question consider too narrow a range of action, fail to provide convincing evidence 
on the orientations of the workers involved, and ignore the political context. 
When push comes to shove, labor historians who are concerned with national la-
bor movements seem to want one or both of two things: a) persuasive reconstitu-
tions of the shared states of mind of the principal actors at different points in time, 
b) tactical replays of the interactions among various groups of workers, labor lead-
ers, capitalists, political powerholders, state officials, and other significant actors in 
the national arena. Formal studies of strike activity and of the organizational bases 
of worker collective action set some limits on the possible reconstitutions of shared 
states of mind, but provide no effective means for getting at them directly. Dealing 
with strikes in nineteenth-century Massachusetts, for instance, Carol Conell is able 
to build mathematical models whose empirical application strongly suggests an im-
portant conclusion: skilled workers timed and located both their organization and 
their strike activity to maximize the impact of withholding their labor, and the ad-
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vantage of organization and timing to them was significantly greater than it was for 
less skilled workers. But Conell’s results cannot tell us whether skilled workers 
made self-conscious calculations to that effect6. 
On the side of strategy and tactics, in principle, it is possible to capture tactical 
interplay in formal models; in practice, the difficulties of measurement and model-
ing entailed by the analysis of fluctuations in the national politics of labor will ex-
ceed anyone’s technical capacity for some time to come. Instead, labor historians 
are likely to continue with analytically-informed narratives and broad, complex 
comparisons of a few national experiences at a time. Neither of these enterprises 
will yield readily to formalization. 
Or take the other core problem: the connections among the organization of pro-
duction, class formation, and worker collective action. Several of the formalized 
analyses in my earlier list obviously touch on the problem: studies of organizational 
bases of worker collective action, labor migration, and social mobility. Yet labor 
historians tend to insist on the consciousness and experience contained in class for-
mation, and the political interaction affecting worker collective action. They also 
tend to broaden “class formation” and “worker collective action” to embrace a wide 
range of behavior. In those circumstances, the existing formalizations become pe-
ripheral to the real enterprise, and the formalizations that are possible in principle 
become enormously demanding. 
Common understandings of labor history’s core focus on matters that yield only 
with great difficulty to formal analysis. Class consciousness is the obvious, and no 
doubt the most important, example. But recently different varieties of culture have 
preempted the territory previously occupied by class consciousness. If the current 
drift toward retrospective ethnography, individual experience, and discourse con-
tinues, formalization will spread slowly, remain at its present low level, or even de-
cline in significance. 
Nevertheless, the periphery constrains the core. Collective biography, as the cen-
tral evidence-producing procedure of formal analysis, necessarily sets limits on a 
wide variety of arguments in labor history. Findings of studies dealing with labor 
migration, industrial conflict, daily life and other “peripheral” subjects set limits on 
plausible reconstructions of the connections among production, class formation, and 
collective action, or on explanations of fluctuations in national labor militancy and 
effectiveness. Studies by Victoria Bonnell, Diane Koenker, William Rosenberg, and 
others concerning the organization and action of workers in Moscow and Petrograd, 
for example, now make it virtually impossible to portray working-class involve-
ment in twentieth-century Russian movements as a consequence of the thrusting of 
uprooted peasants into big-city industrial life7. 
Again, research on the dynamics of rural industry by Franklin Mendels, David 
Levine, Yves Lequin, and others has established the wide extent of rural proletari-
anization—and therefore of a kind of class formation—in Europe before the period 
                                                             
6  Carol Conell, “The Impact of Union Sponsorship on Strikes in Nineteenth Century Massa-
chusetts,” unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Michigan, 1980. 
7  Victoria Bonnell, Roots of Rebellion: Workers’ Politics and Organization in St. Petersburg 
and Moscow, 1900-1914 (Berkeley, 1983); Diane Koenker, Moscow Workers and the 1917 
Revolution (Princeton, 1981); and William G. Rosenberg, “Workers and Workers’ Control 
in the Russian Revolution”, History Workshop Journal, 5 (1978): 89-97. 
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of capital-concentrated industrialization, the complex interdependence between pro-
letarianization and population growth, and the importance of regional systems link-
ing the labor and capital of city and country. These findings limit our possible ac-
counts of the qualitative experience of industrialization. They thereby make more 
dubious the oncepopular explanations of working-class action that stressed the 
shock of abrupt-exposure to industrial conditions8. Over the last two decades, im-
portant findings on such matters have emerged from formal analysis, and would 
have been less likely to appear without formal analysis. 
Conditions for Change 
Formalization, then, does have a bearing on the core questions of labor history. Un-
der what circumstances might we expect formal analyses to become everyday ac-
tivities of labor historians, as they have for economic, demographic, and urban his-
torians? Three possibilities come to mind: 1) that some group of scholars who are 
directly addressing labor history’s core questions will develop a kind of formaliza-
tion that will transform the field: 2) that the core will shift to questions that now 
remain in the periphery, and for which effective formal procedures exist; 3) that an 
intellectual revolution will establish a new core that lends itself directly to formal 
analyses. None of the three is likely. 
It is possible, but improbable, that some great success will establish formal 
analysis at the core of labor history. American urban history once concentrated on 
urban biographies and general portrayals of urbanization. It shifted rapidly toward 
some kinds of quantitative work when Stephan Thernstrom and a few other pio-
neers demonstrated that through a variety of collective biography urban history 
could produce results bearing on one of American history’s grandest questions: to 
what extent is the United States a land of opportunity, and how much has that op-
portunity changed over time9? In retrospect, one can see readily that the question 
has a quantitative, structural component that lends itself to formal treatment. In 
prospect, however, it is not so easy to see that either of the dominant agendas of 
labor history—the one linking production, class formation, and working-class ac-
tion or the one dealing with national labor movements—will yield to formal treat-
ments that most labor historians will recognize as contributions to their field. 
It is possible, but even less probable, that the periphery will transform the core—
that because of the transformation of our understanding of labor history through 
work on such matters as labor migration, gender, or industrial conflict the standard 
questions concerning national labor movements or the established triad of produc-
tion, consciousness, and collective action will come to seem less central to the en-
tire enterprise. To some extent, such shifts have occurred in economic and social 
                                                             
8  Franklin Mendels, “Seasons and Regions in Agriculture and Industry during the Process of 
Industrialization,” in: Sidney Pollard, ed., Region und Industrialisierung: Studien zur Rolle 
der Region in der Wirtschaftsgeschichte der letzten zwei Jahrhunderte (Göttingen, 1980); 
David Levine, ed., Proletarization and Family Life (Orlando, Fl, 1984); and Yves Lequin, 
Les ouvriers de la région lyonnaise, 1848-1914 (Lyon, 1977), 2 vols. 
9  Stephan Thernstrom, Poverty and Progress: Social Mobility in a Nineteenth Century City 
(Cambridge, 1964); and “The New Urban History,” in: Charles F. Delzel, ed., The Future as 
History (Nashville, 1977). 
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history; peripheral questions (such as how, if at all, industrialization transformed 
social relations within families) became core questions. 
The creation of an entirely new core is unlikely and unpredictable. If it occurs at 
all, changes in the political environments of scholars concerned with labor the suc-
cess of a certain kind of revolution, the failure of another, a fundamental shift in the 
positions of workers and organized labor will surely play a part in the redefinition 
of labor history’s subject matter. In that unpredictable event, the discipline’s orga-
nizing questions could move toward problems that lend themselves to formal analy-
sis. They could also, however, emphasize problems that are even less amenable to 
formalization. This possibility therefore leads to no forecast at all. 
Let me add a disclaimer. I do not claim that a shift to formalization, or to the 
sorts of peripheral questions that lend themselves to formalization, would “im-
prove” or even “clarify” labor history. I do claim that in the present organization of 
the field a great expansion of formal analysis at its core is very, very unlikely. Not 
unless the organizing questions of labor history change significantly will comput-
ing, quantification, and other formalizations become central to the discipline. To the 
extent that members of the discipline move toward questions involving explicit 
models, systematic variation, comparison of many cases, and intrinsically quantita-
tive phenomena, conversely, they will become receptive to formalization. 
The same reasoning applies, I believe, to the rest of history. In political history, 
diplomatic history, intellectual history, and a number of other fields, no large ex-
pansion of formalization will occur unless the dominant questions change. In any of 
the fields someone could devise a formal method that would recast a major ques-
tion, currently peripheral questions that lend themselves to formalization could be-
come more pressing, or an intellectual revolution that replaced the core questions 
could occur. As the use of computers for such routine tasks as the preparation and 
storage of texts increases, historians might find themselves drifting into the pursuit 
of questions that only computers make practicable. As the findings of those fields 
that have invested heavily in formalization, such as economic history, impinge on 
the questions people are asking in other fields (for example, by stretching out the 
“industrial revolution” over such a long period that it stops being a plausible expla-
nation of abrupt changes in popular politics), historians in unformalized fields may 
find themselves compelled to formalize, if only to drive away the formalizers. 
No doubt we can invent other scenarios that would produce a rapid, large in-
crease in historical formalization. Nevertheless, the main points remain: in today’s 
practice of history, with few exceptions, the dominant questions around which prac-
titioners organize resist formal analysis; those questions guide a great deal of re-
search and change rather slowly. Without a substantial alteration of those questions 
we have no reason to expect a rapid expansion of formalization. 
